Between 1945 and 2005, nation-states around the world revised their criminal laws on sexual activities. This global reform wave-across countries and domains of sexual activityfollowed from the reconstitution of world models of society around individuals rather than corporate bodies. During the post-World War II period, this process rearranged the global cultural and organizational underpinnings of sex, eroding world-level support for criminal laws aimed at protecting collective entities-especially the family and the nation-and strengthening world support for laws aimed at protecting individualized persons. To make our case, we use unique cross-national and longitudinal data on the criminal regulation of rape, adultery, sodomy, and child sexual abuse. The data reveal striking counter-directional trends in sexlaw reforms, which simultaneously elaborated regulations protecting individuals and dissolved laws protecting collective entities. World-level negative-binomial regression analyses and country-level event-history analyses confirm our main propositions. The findings demonstrate a sweeping revolution in criminal-sex laws, rooted in the intensified global celebration of free-standing personhood.
Over recent decades, countries around the world rewrote their criminal laws regulating sexual activities. The reforms accumulated rapidly but have escaped systematic analysis. The few studies that exist tend to restrict focus to specific kinds of sexual activities (e.g., rape or sodomy) in isolation from the broader policy field and to confine attention to certain, usually Western, countries. These two tendencies encourage explanations that prioritize sector-specific domestic actors in promoting regulatory revisions (e.g., local women's groups against rape) and downplay overarching shifts in the global-institutional environment. In this article, we stress the latter, arguing that the ongoing individualization of world models of society in the postWorld War II period generated wholesale redefinitions of sex, which in turn facilitated a worldwide wave of sex-law reforms. To explore our argument, we analyze original cross-national and longitudinal data on the criminal regulation of rape, adultery, sodomy, and child sexual abuse between 1945 and 2005. Across countries, we find striking contractions in the criminal regulation of adultery and sodomy, concomitant with striking expansions in the criminal regulation of rape and child sexual abuse. World-level patterns of contraction and expansion display the logic of individualization; with the results of negative-binomial regression and eventhistory analyses, they lend strong support to our arguments.
REFORMS ACROSS COUNTRIES AND DOMAINS OF SEXUAL ACTIVITY
Between 1945 and 2005, criminal laws regulating sexual activities shifted all over the world. Some laws expanded, some contracted, and still others expanded along some dimensions and contracted along others.
In New Zealand, for example, the Prostitution Reform Act shifted the burden of criminal sanctions from sex workers (usually female) onto those who exploit them (usually male). In particular, 2003 legislation legalized ''commercial sexual services'' while safeguarding sex workers' human rights and prohibiting the prostitution of persons under 18 years of age (Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network 2005) . In recent years, similar revisionsembodying principles articulated in the 1985 World Charter for Prostitutes' Rights-transformed prostitution statutes in countries around the world (Bernstein 2005) . 1 South Africa, meanwhile, greatly elaborated its pornography regulations. In 1996, the Film and Publications Act not only decriminalized the distribution of adult pornography but also criminalized the distribution of child pornography, rendering the latter as punishable with at least five years in prison. Amendments in 2004 raised the minimum prison term for child pornography to 10 years and made it a crime for witnesses not to contact police. During the same period, analogous changes to pornography laws took effect in countries around the world; many of the laws were adopted in the wake of the 1996 First World Congress against the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children. 2 In Romania, even the incest law came under scrutiny recently. During the twentieth century, criminal sanctions against the socalled universal taboo varied widely, from no penalties at all to prison terms and even death. Contemporary debates center on the criminal regulation of incestuous relations between adult cousins and siblings. During Romania's penal-code review in 2009, the Justice Ministry sought to decriminalize adult incest, on the grounds that private and consensual sex between adults is victimless. Deliberation on the matter continues, in Romania and elsewhere. 3 Anecdotal evidence along these lines suggests that countries around the world passed all kinds of sex-law reforms between 1945 and 2005-on trafficking, sexual harassment, contraception, prostitution, abortion, bestiality, pornography, incest, rape, adultery, sodomy, child sexual abuse, and so on. The critical question is obvious. What drove these striking developments?
CASE-BY-CASE APPROACHES
Dominant frameworks in the sociology of law deflect attention from such questions; instead, they prioritize the relationship of formal laws to laws in practice (Halliday and Carruthers 2007; Sutton 2001) . Accordingly, most scholars take micro approaches to legal change, focusing on narrow developments in particular (usually Western) country contexts.
Vis-à-vis sex laws, the spotlight has shined, for example, on the reform of sodomy laws in the United States and South Africa (Bernstein 2003; Cock 2003; Werum and Winders 2001) ; sexual harassment policies in the United States, France, and Israel (Kamir 2003; Saguy 2000) ; and prostitution regulations in Jamaica and the United States (Bernstein 2005; Kempadoo 2004) . Most accounts underscore the centrality of grassroots social movements in promoting penal reforms (e.g., Kane 2003; Menon 1983; Weitzer 2007; Zippel 2004) , and some stress domestic cultural or political conditions (e.g., Western-ness or democracy) (Adam 1999; Green 1999; cf. Savelsberg and King 2005) . These case studies are often rich in detail, illuminating long-dark questions at the intersection of sex and society.
Indeed, the prevailing case-study approach to sex-law reforms enjoys many clear advantages, including practical ones related to data availability. But the approach does have disadvantages. By design, case studies accentuate specific sex laws in specific polities, implying (1) that reforms in particular domains of sexual activity are not fundamentally related to others and (2) that changes in particular country contexts are not fundamentally related to others.
Neither implication is entirely tenable. First, the tendency to restrict analytic attention to isolated kinds of sex laws-on prostitution, for example-may exaggerate the independence of particular regulations within the wider policy field. Foucault (1978) and many others stress reconceptions of sex writ large, and public discourse (both sober and reactionary) routinely intermingles various sexual activities-tying, for example, pornography to rape and sex trafficking to prostitution (Weitzer 2007) . Penal codes themselves typically cluster sex regulations, as in the pre-1995 Argentine Código Penal, which criminalized adultery in article 118 and rape in article 119. Arguably, sex laws occupy a coherent policy field.
Second, the literature's propensity for examining legal developments in specific national contexts may preclude or at least limit the consideration of global antecedents of reform, which may be expected given that criminal codes ''rest on universalistic and rationalistic cultural assumptions'' (Boyle and Meyer 1998:213) . Formal, rationalized criminal codes arose in modern Europe within the apparatus of the nation-state, and they diffused through colonial networks (Benton 2002) . Penal codes originate in global institutions, and so may impulses for reform.
We see substantial promise in moving up a level of analysis to assess the possibility that postwar developments in the criminal regulation of sex stretched across domains of activity and types of country. In making this move, we set aside the crucial de jure-de facto question and approach law as an outcome and index of wider social change (Halliday and Carruthers 2007). We justify this departure from convention on three grounds. First, many studies show that formal laws are loaded with symbolic and cultural meanings, particularly at moments of reform, and all the more so when reforms are clustered across domains of activity or countries, such that huge waves of legal reform suggest fundamental shifts in legitimated discourse and authorized culture (Boyle and Meyer 1998; Durkheim [1893 Durkheim [ ] 1997 Edelman 1992; Gusfield 1986) . Second, studies demonstrate that formal laws themselves maintain enforcement threats and social control, inform policy debates, and contribute cognitive and normative materials to the overall social regulation of sex (Posner 1994) . 4 Third, at least one recent study suggests that formal sex laws are systematically related to sex laws in practice, despite case-level loose coupling (Frank, Hardinge, and Wosick-Correa 2009) . While this study may be difficult to generalize given the intensity of public mobilization around rape, it demonstrates the peril of treating cases of loose coupling as a rule of decoupling. On these grounds, we justify our focus on formal sex laws. We flesh out our reasoning before proceeding to the empirical analysis.
EVOLVING WORLD MODELS
Our argument builds on the world-society branch of sociological institutionalism Meyer et al. 1997) . This perspective has cast light on many world social phenomena-from the rise of science (Drori et al. 2003) and the expansion of education (Baker and LeTendre 2005; Schofer and Meyer 2005) to the perpetuation of war (Hironaka 2005) and the ascent of environmental protection (Frank, Longhofer, and Schofer 2007) .
The world-society perspective departs from conventional sociological frameworks on several grounds. (1) It asserts that society is an institutional system rather than a functional or action system, comprised of organized and rule-like models constituting society's actors, their action capacities, and their interrelationships. (2) The perspective posits that throughout modernity, and especially after World War II, models of society have been increasingly forged in the universalizing hands of experts, professionals, and scientists, advancing general truths, rather than in the particularizing crucibles of functional needs or actor interests. (3) It holds that contemporary models of society, as a result, have grown increasingly universalistic, rationalized, and global rather than particularistic, fragmented, and local or national. From a world-society perspective, the needs and interests that dominate conventional sociological accounts are not real or given but derive from exogenous blueprints and building blocks.
Guided accordingly, we call attention to a basic shift in world models of society. This shift, we argue, prompted a world-level redefinition of sex and, in turn, global transformations in its criminal regulation. Specifically, we propose the following:
1. The cauldron of World War II spurred the reconstitution of world models of society. Nazism's genocidal atrocities stigmatized formerly dominant templates that were grounded in collective entities such as nations and families. In their stead rose deeply individualized models, promoted by the Allied victors (Borgwardt 2005) . These new alternatives designated autonomous persons as society's ultimate motivators and beneficiaries (Frank and Meyer 2002) .
Individualization disembedded persons from corporate bodies and rendered them as existentially equal across collective boundaries. As corporate designations (e.g., mother, child, or gay) lost their defining grip, it grew commonplace to refer to persons generically-and equally-as individuals (Donnelly 2002) .
Of course, individualized models of society did not originate with World War II but rose with modernity, as in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man (Berger 1970; Jepperson 2002) . Furthermore, individualized models of society did not transform every social sector equally after World War II. Still, the war marked a watershed. It spurred the long-term trend toward individualization, ushering Western-born models of individualized society onto an increasingly globalized stage.
Individualization promoted the reconstitution of whole divisions of world social life. The process contributed, for instance, to the global rise of capitalism, organized around individualized wage labor and consumption (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006) ; the worldwide spread of democracy, organized around individualized citizenship and voting (Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997) ; and the cross-national expansion of mass education, organized around individualized understanding and achievement (McEneaney 2003) . This foundational shift culminated in the widespread recognition of a growing number of universal human rights-conceived as the natural and equal birthright of every human individual (Cole 2005; Elliott 2007; Suárez and Ramirez 2007; Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004) .
2. Following from this baseline shift in world models of society, world-level definitions of sex evolved, too. Sex shifted from an activity meant to propagate the collective order through sanctioned reproduction to an activity meant to enhance individual pleasure through self-expression. In the phrase of one observer, sex as procreation gave way to sex as recreation during the post-World War II decades (Gordan 1971) .
Formerly dominant corporatist institutions relegated legitimate sexual relations to ''natural'' forms of intercourse that strengthened society's collective bases, including families, nations, races, and religions (Lévi-Strauss 1969; Mosse 1985) . Mixing across boundaries, irrespective of reproductive obligations, breached the corporate order. The preferred (or sole legitimate) sexual activity consisted of contraceptive-free vaginal intercourse, and the preferred (or sole legitimate) participants were husband and wife. ''The natural object of carnal intercourse is that there be the possibility of conception of [a legitimate] human being'' (Halim 1989 (Halim :1292 . This possibility was flouted by ''unnatural'' activities such as, ''self-abuse, sexual union between male and male, sexual intercourse with an animal, connection with a dead woman, sexual intercourse contrary to the order of nature with a woman, and lewdness between woman and woman'' (Lansdown 1960:108-109) . Under collectivized assumptions, sex meant procreation-oriented intercourse conducted within established social parameters. 5 Other sexual behaviors threatened to disrupt the collective order and violate the procreation imperative. They were thus deviant and unnatural.
The postwar individualization of world models of society reshaped this conceptual landscape. Increasingly, sex was conceived through an individualized prism, with expressive dimensions tied to the desires of freestanding persons (Giddens 1992) . The primacy of penile-vaginal intercourseessential to the procreation imperativedeclined, and all kinds of formerly stigmatized activities came to count as sex (Laumann et al. 1994; Wosick-Correa 2007) . At the same time, preemptive collective boundaries diminished, loosening prohibitions against sex outside marriage and across religious and racial lines (Rosenfeld 2007; Widmer, Treas, and Newcomb 1998) . Contraception grew commonplace, undercutting the old priority of reproduction and asserting the new dominance of individual pleasure.
6 Consent emerged as the cardinal rule of sexual relations, and free self-expression grew paramount. Increasingly, legitimate sex came to include only those activities that preserved individual autonomy and sovereignty. Other activities were nonconsensual and condemned accordingly (Stinchcombe and Nielsen 2009) .
The redefinition of sex reconstituted the moral in sexual morality and the victim in victimless sex crimes. While it is now commonplace to assume that victims are necessarily individuals, crime victims in traditional collectivized contexts were more likely to be corporate entities-including the family, the public, and the nation. Old ''violations of public morals'' victimized ''society at large-the public itself-rather than any individual'' (Dehesa 2010:31) . A seventeenth-century criminal lawyer for the Lutheran Church in Germany warned vividly of sodomy's collective dangers: ''earthquakes, famine, plague, saracens, floods, and very fat, insatiable burrowing mice'' (Lee and Robertson 1973:241) . The victim in this florid imagery is society in toto.
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Indeed, during the post-World War II period, many countries reclassified sex crimes from offenses against morality, the family, good customs, honor, or chastityprioritizing the corporate order-to offenses against liberty, self-determination, or physical integrity-emphasizing individual freedom. In Poland, for example, Crimes of Lasciviousness became Crimes against Liberty, and in Panama, Crimes against Good Customs and the Family became Crimes against Modesty and Sexual Liberty. Such reclassifications highlight the primacy of individualization in catalyzing global sex-law reforms.
3. Together, the individualization of world models of society and sex redirected legitimacy among different types of criminal sex regulations between 1945 and 2005. 8 Individualization weakened global support for sex laws defending collective entities (especially families and nations) and strengthened global support for laws protecting individuals (Frank and McEneaney 1999; Hörnle 2000; Ramirez 1987 ). The implications carried across domains of sexual activity.
The erosion of global support for corporatist sex laws and the elevation of support for individualist laws appear very starkly at the margins-that is, among regulations preserving corporate bodies at the expense of individual bodies and vice versa. The former include crimes of passion, such as those committed when husbands murder their adulteress wives. To an extreme extent, such crimes assert family sanctity over individual liberty, and to an extreme extent, they lost legitimacy during recent decades. 9 The international community now strictly condemns such murders as human-rights violations (Kardam 2007) . Marital rape is in the same category. A judge in England articulated the old corporatist thinking: ''The intercourse which takes place between husband and wife is not by virtue of any special consent on her part, but is mere submission to an obligation imposed on her by law'' (quoted in Turner 1958:791; see also Giddens 1992) . Marital exemptions from rape laws subordinate individual female desires to corporate family responsibilities; these exemptions grew vulnerable with postwar individualization.
Policies that uphold individual integrity despite collective burdens are at the opposite end of the spectrum. Decriminalization of contraception and pornography provide cases in point. Contraception and pornography expose corporate bodies to the draining influences of non-procreative sex, but decriminalization nevertheless proceeded, as worldcultural changes promoted the priority of the individual over the collective in the global logic of regulations.
World individualization, in short, redistributed legitimacy among various kinds of sex laws, facilitating pervasive reforms in the postwar era. The salient symbolic and cultural loadings are obvious. Sex laws rooted in corporatist models of society died on the vine, while laws anchored in individualist models-that is, organized around the paramount rule of consent and cast in terms of human rights-grew rapidly worldwide. These world-cultural changes-reconstituting society, sex, and sex laws-laid the foundations of change. They operated through an elaborating organizational interface furnishing concrete mechanisms of change.
4. Mechanisms linking world-cultural changes to domestic penal reforms proliferated with the rise of intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations (IGOs and INGOs) embodying world structuration and legalization, the legitimated organizational and legal infrastructures of world society. These entities constituted a global imagined community and established the rule of law as a standardized social good. They supplied essential building blocks to national criminal codes during the postwar decades (Boyle 2002; Merry 2006) .
Rich, core, Western countries had significantly more INGO ties than did others during this period (Beckfield 2003) . At the same time, INGOs and IGOs carefully distanced themselves from overtly Western agendas. Precisely because they cultivated postures of disinterested expertise, IGOs and INGOs offered uniquely effective mechanisms for distributing legal templates to the whole population of nation-states Meyer and Jepperson 2000) . Replete with professional authority, they appeared as standard-builders and standard-bearers, offering generic packages of technical advice and best practices (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2002) .
Some of the pertinent IGOs and INGOs were generalist in orientation; they advanced sex-law reforms under broad rubrics of progress, rationalization, secularization, and human rights (Dehesa 2010 Other IGOs and INGOs dedicated themselves directly to sex-law reforms, although they too typically invoked universal frameworks of progress and justice. Recently, for example, ECPAT International sought ''to encourage the world community to ensure that children everywhere enjoy their fundamental rights free from all forms of commercial sexual exploitation'' (see http://www .ecpat.net/worldcongressIII/who2.php) (ECPAT stands for End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography and Trafficking of Children for Sexual Purposes). Similarly, the United Nations AIDS Commission called on states to reform their criminal laws to align ''with international human rights obligations. . . . Criminal laws prohibiting sexual acts (including adultery, sodomy, fornication and commercial sexual encounters) between consenting adults in private should be reviewed, with the aim of repeal'' (Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 2006:123). Although dedicated IGOs and INGOs focused on the reform of sex laws as such, they nearly always justified their claims on the same universal bases as their generalist counterparts.
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In pursuit of penal reform, IGOs and INGOs transmitted global reform signals to domestic receptor sites-that is, the official ministerial and civil-society representatives designed to interface with world society. Transmission often occurred at international conferences (e.g., the Fourth World Conference for Women) that culminated in international agreements (e.g., the Convention on the Rights of the Child) that typically specified-directly and explicitly-the contents of legitimate criminal laws. Spikes in international organizations' activities generally translated into spikes in domestic amendments. In this way, global-and nationallevel mechanisms operated in tandem to encourage sex-law reforms (Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006 
EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS
These arguments have several empirical implications. Generally, we anticipate the dominance of individualizing sex-law reforms between 1945 and 2005-that is, we should find contractions in laws aimed at preserving corporate entities and expansions in laws aimed at preserving individual entities. We expect that both sets of changes should occur on a worldwide basis, more or less concurrently, and that the reforms themselves should take stylized forms, reflecting their global origins.
More specifically, our arguments predict, contra case-based explanations, that the main impulses for individualizing sex-law reforms were:
1A. Not only local but global, across all sorts of countries. 1B. Not only particular but encompassing, across domains of sexual activity.
Furthermore, following from our global-institutional perspective, our arguments predict that central impulses for individualizing sexlaw reforms were:
2A. Born of a cultural process we call world individualization, which recast world models of society and world definitions of sex, thus altering the legitimacy of different kinds of criminal regulation. 2B. Carried by two organizational processes: world structuration, which expanded the basic platforms for global activities, and world legalization, which expanded the basic apparatus of global law.
To the extent our expectations hold true, they challenge the literature's prevailing focus on particular countries and domains of sexual activity, and they support our alternative focus on global institutions. We operationalize the key ideas before undertaking the analyses.
RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA, AND METHODS
To explore our world-level arguments, we assembled an original cross-national dataset containing criminal regulations on rape, adultery, sodomy, and child sexual abuse for the period 1945 to 2005. Compared with alternatives-for example, laws on prostitution or incest-the relationship between global individualization and these four laws is relatively uncomplicated, allowing us to make straightforward predictions about reform. We sought data on all four laws over the whole 60-year timeframe for all 194 nation-states in existence during the period. 12 We organized our efforts to allow us to test the empirical implications noted earlier.
As indicators of laws aimed at preserving corporate entities, we chose adultery and sodomy statutes. Both distill the procreation imperative and disregard matters of consent. Adultery laws criminalize sexual intercourse between married persons and non-spouse others. For example, before 1971, Article 502 of Austria's Penal Code read:
A married person who commits adultery, as well as an unmarried person with whom adultery is committed, becomes guilty of a petty misdemeanor and shall be punished by arrest of 1 to 6 months. However, the punishment of the woman shall be more severe if by the commission of the adultery doubts can be raised in regard to the legitimacy of a subsequent birth.
Precedence of the family bloodline is explicit here. For their part, sodomy laws penalize ''unnatural''-that is, non-procreativecarnal connections, most commonly meaning anal intercourse (sometimes homosexual only, sometimes homo-and heterosexual). For example, in 2005, Article 377 of India's Penal Code stated:
Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman, or animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years, and shall also be liable to fine. Penetration is sufficient to constitute the carnal intercourse necessary to the offence described in this section.
Both of these sexual activities are problematic almost exclusively on collective grounds. Adultery threatens the family and collective order and raises the specter of illegitimate children, while sodomy directly denigrates the procreation imperative. The South African Law Reform Commission (South African Law Commission 1999:124) summarized the arguments against both in 1999:
The reasons usually advanced for criminalizing sodomy are: it denies the basic purpose of the sexual relationship, viz. procreation; [and] it subverts the institution of the family. . . . Further, if concern for the family is the reason for criminalizing sodomy, then adultery ought also to be a crime.
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In contrast to the crimes of rape and child sexual abuse described below, individual choice is irrelevant in adultery and sodomy cases. For example, under Singapore's sodomy law, it is ''immaterial . . . whether there was consent between the males involved'' (D 'Souza 2001:567) . We expect adultery and sodomy laws to contract worldwide during the postwar era.
As indicators of laws aimed at preserving individual entities, we selected rape and child-sexual-abuse provisions. Both squarely defend the cardinal rule of consent and largely ignore collective concerns. Rape laws criminalize nonconsensual sexual activities between adults, while child-sexual-abuse laws penalize nonviolent carnal connections between adults and children. In the 2005 Panamanian Penal Code, both are covered under Article 216:
Whoever sexually accesses a person of either sex, using their genitals or other parts of their body, or introducing other objects into the genitals, mouth, or anus of the victim, shall be punished with imprisonment of 3 to 10 years in the following cases:
1. When violence or intimidation is used; 2. When the victim is deprived of reason or good judgment, or when, as a result of physical or mental illness or for any other reason, the victim is unable to resist; and 3. When the victim is detained or seized and trusting of the culprit to transport him or her from one place to another. 4. When the victim has not completed 14 years, even if none of the previous circumstances apply.
Rape and child sexual abuse stand on individualist foundations. Rape is criminalized precisely because it violates the rule of consent, while child sexual abuse exploits children's inability to make free and reasoned decisions and is thus nonconsensual by definition. In contrast to adultery and sodomy, the procreation imperative is irrelevant in rape and child-sexual-abuse cases. The latter acts are criminal regardless of whether pregnancy or marriage ensues (although a few countries retain old corporatist exemptions for rapists who marry their victims and thereby restore the collective order). We expect worldwide expansions in both kinds of laws during the period in question.
We do not claim that rape and child sexual abuse are unproblematic in collectivized contexts. They are indeed, but the main ''problem'' is that they are extramarital. In many traditional contexts, rape and child sexual abuse are treated as subtypes of adultery or fornication.
14 Nor do we claim that adultery and sodomy are trouble-free in individualized contexts. Much public-opinion data suggests otherwise (Widmer et al. 1998) . Nevertheless, adultery and sodomy are largely deemed to be private matters, not criminal, to be handled by the individuals personally involved.
Because terms like adultery and rape are not used uniformly across country contexts, we work with the following definitions: adultery refers to consensual heterosexual intercourse between married persons and nonspouse others; sodomy describes consensual homosexual intercourse between adults; rape indicates nonconsensual heterosexual intercourse between adults; 15 and child sexual abuse refers to nonviolent heterosexual intercourse between adults and minor children. These definitions guided our data collection as we moved through different national milieus.
The raw data for our analyses come directly from the national penal codes in force between 1945 and 2005 in all independent countries worldwide. Only two countries in our dataset (i.e., the United States and Australia) regulated sex crimes subnationally during the period; in these cases, we used penal codes from the most populous subnational entity (i.e., California and New South Wales). Such cases are far too few in number to affect the results. A tiny number of countries had no codified criminal laws, and we excluded these.
To assemble complete penal-code records for the time period, we combed the libraries of Congress and many universities (e.g., libraries at Harvard, the University of Chicago, and Stanford). We also scoured online databases, where many current criminal codes are now found. From each available code, we extracted, and where necessary translated, the laws covering rape, adultery, sodomy, and child sexual abuse as they appeared and evolved on the books over time. This task was simplified by the fact that sex laws usually appear together in criminal codes (under headings such as ''Moral'' or ''Sexual Offenses'') and that most codes are written in one of the major colonial languages (i.e., English, French, or Spanish). 16 We entered the relevant laws verbatim into a master data-file.
In the end, some penal-code data remain missing for some countries, and most penalcode data remain missing for others. Nevertheless, the resulting dataset is unique in breadth and depth. Table S1 in the online supplement (http://asr.sagepub.com/supple mental) summarizes our data coverage for the world's 194 independent countries from 1945 to 2005. For more than half the nation-states-102 to be exact-we achieved full coverage, defined as data on rape, adultery, sodomy, and child-sexualabuse laws for at least 75 percent of the designated time period (i.e., at least 45 years of the 60-year period, unless the country gained independence after 1945, in which case it is scaled accordingly). For another 43 countries, we achieved substantial coverage, meaning complete data for 40 to 74 percent of the pertinent years. For the remaining 49 countries, our coverage remains incomplete, with data on all four sex laws for no more than 39 percent of the eligible time spell.
17 The nation-states in the last category are disproportionately small, poor, and peripheral. Such countries seldom have the wherewithal to attempt penal-code creativity, and our experience -based on the small, poor, and peripheral countries for which we do have dataindicates they are likely to follow standard legislative templates (often delivered almost wholesale from colonial powers).
We know of no comparable cross-national and longitudinal compilations of criminal law, and received wisdom suggests they would be difficult to assemble. As seminal components of the modern nation-state apparatus, however, criminal laws are carefully documented, widely distributed, and publicly available (Boli-Bennett and Meyer 1978; Boyle and Meyer 1998; Meyer et al. 1997) . We were thus able to amass a broad evidentiary base on which to test our global claims.
To measure the contractions and expansions of law discussed earlier, we coded changes in each law's scope over time. Scope refers to the actions and the actorsboth offenders and victims-covered under the law. Contraction occurs when the scope of a law shrinks upon reform, criminalizing a narrower range of actions or offenders or protecting a narrower range of victims. Concretely here, contraction often entails outright abrogation. Expansion occurs under opposite circumstances.
18 A country may register two scope reforms in a single year if it alters both the coverage of actors and the coverage of actions, or if coverage expands vis-à-vis some actors or actions and simultaneously contracts vis-à-vis others. For example, scope expansion takes place both when a rape law undergoes gender neutralization (i.e., men gain protections alongside women) and when a rape law is rewritten to penalize unwanted sexual penetration of any kind (i.e., beyond penilevaginal intercourse).
Our data include only those criminal laws that explicitly address adultery, rape, sodomy, and child sexual abuse. This means we do not count other criminal laws that might implicitly regulate the same sexual activities (e.g., laws against public indecency); nor do we consider changes beyond the penal code (e.g., in family, civil, or penal-procedure laws). This also means we focus on formal laws on the books.
EXPLORATORY ANALYSES
Figures 1 and 2 present an initial look at the data. Figure 1 summarizes reforms in the two kinds of laws we expect to contract with the rise of individualized models of society (i.e., sodomy and adultery). Figure 2 summarizes reforms in the two kinds of laws we expect to expand under the same conditions (i.e., child sexual abuse and rape). To capture trends and cycles, each line represents a five-year moving average of numbers of worldwide reforms between 1945 and 2005.
The figures indicate the global dimensions of sex-law reforms. Changes unfolded along common lines across country contexts; Figure  1 shows the clear dominance of scope contractions over expansions, and Figure 2 shows the even clearer dominance of scope expansions over contractions. Global trends are pronounced in the figures, suggesting world-level reform factors over and above the domestic factors usually stressed in the literature.
Figures 1 and 2 also suggest that the four kinds of sex laws occupy a common policy field. In both figures, the dominant reform waves began slowly after World War II, picked up steam in the late 1960s, and then took off in the late 1980s. The parallel timing suggests shared determinants of change, lending credence to our claim that the literature understates the extent of an integrated policy field.
Finally, the figures show that the dominant trend-lines moved toward opposite ends during the postwar era, consistent with an underlying logic of individualization. In general, sodomy and adultery were decreasingly criminalized on a global basis, while rape and child sexual abuse were increasingly criminalized. The counter-posing movements suggest that sex laws defending the imperative of corporate reproduction receded while sex laws defending the cardinal rule of individual consent advanced. Clearly, states did not ''get out of the bedroom'' during this period but moved from its collectivized to its individualized corner.
19 Tables 1 and 2 corroborate and extend these findings. For two of the four laws in question, the tables delineate exactly which changes occurred in what countries and when (for sodomy and rape, see Tables S2  and S3 in the online supplement). First, the tables substantiate and detail the worldwide extent of sex-law reforms. They reveal that 47 countries changed their adultery regulations during the post-World War II period (see Table 1 ), while 90 nation-states revised their child-sexual-abuse provisions (see Table 2 ). (The numbers are 72 and 77 for sodomy and rape, respectively.) Participants are hardly confined to the developed West. For example, the first five countries to decriminalize sodomy after 1945 were Portugal (for the second time in its history), Greece, Thailand, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. The reform movement was ostentatiously global in reach.
Differences in the sheer numbers of countries adopting child-sexual-abuse and rape reforms (90 and 77) versus sodomy and adultery reforms (72 and 47) reflect the fact that sodomy laws were mostly peculiar to the British Commonwealth, while adultery laws were mostly peculiar to the French and Spanish colonial orbit. Sodomy, for instance, was once punishable by death in France and in England (Tatchell 1992) . In 1791, however, the French National Assembly abolished the prohibition on the individualistic premise that, ''liberty consists in the freedom to do everything which injures no one else'' (Article 4 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man 1789). 20 During the Napoleonic Wars, the French penal code, which now did not have a sodomy law, diffused to Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal; during colonial expansion, it diffused further to dozens of incipient countries. These Napoleonic Code countries comprise more than two-thirds of the 53 nation-states with no sodomy laws to 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 reform during the 1945 to 2005 period. A similar story pertains to adultery laws. In England, adultery was handled in the ecclesiastical courts. Thus, no adultery provision appeared in the penal template that diffused to the colonies. The relatively limited number of sodomy and adultery laws at the outset meant relatively lower numbers of reforms. 21 Second, data in Tables 1 and 2 reinforce the conclusion that individualizing reforms were preponderant during the period. We see that 34 of 50 adultery revisions (68 percent, see Table 1 ) and 83 of 102 sodomy revisions (81 percent, not shown) contracted the law's scope, while 119 of 140 child-sexual-abuse amendments (85 percent, see Table 2 ) and 120 of 123 rape-law amendments (98 percent, not shown) expanded the law's scope. The individualizing trend is pronounced across the domains of sexual activity and proves especially strong vis-à-vis child sexual abuse and rape.
Note, however, the subordinate trends observed in the figures and detailed in the tables. Some countries expanded the scope of their adultery and sodomy laws, and some contracted the scope of their rape and childsexual-abuse laws-against our stated expectations. Presumably, some of these unexpected reforms signify genuine resistance to individualized world models of society, a rich topic for future research. Other cases, however, may represent the shortcomings of a coding scheme that insufficiently accounts for Note: Decrimin, crimin = reforms remove or impose blanket prohibitions (e.g., abrogating old laws). Gender = reforms remove or impose distinctions based on gender (e.g., granting boys equal protection to girls). Extension = reforms remove conditions limiting the scope of the law, other than as specified above. Note: Gender = reforms remove or impose distinctions based on gender (e.g., granting boys equal protection to girls). Age = reforms lower or raise distinctions based on age (e.g., reducing the age of consent). Chastity = reforms remove or impose distinctions based on chastity (e.g., eliminating provisions differentiating prostitutes from maidens). Vaginal = reforms remove or impose distinctions around penile-vaginal sex (e.g., redefining sex to include anal and oral intercourse). Extension = reforms remove conditions limiting the scope of the law, other than as specified above.
different modes of individualization. We did not, for example, anticipate the 16 adulterylaw scope expansions. In Table 1 , however, we see that most such reforms extended existing adultery laws beyond old corporate boundaries, rendering husbands subject to the same adultery regulations that previously applied only to wives. As the corporatist (and patriarchal) framework declined, harsher restrictions on adulteress wives, intended to protect the purity of bloodlines, could no longer be justified. As the individualist framework arose, the inherent dignity of each individual person demanded equal treatment before the law. Thus, at least some expansive adultery amendments-while unexpectedmay embody the logic of individualization. A similar argument applies to the 21 childsexual-abuse scope contractions. While most reforms in this domain increased the scope of legal protections-consistent with the Convention on the Rights of the Child-a substantial minority of reforms did the opposite. Most of these reforms lowered the age of consent and thus protect fewer children, contra our initial expectations (see Table 2 ). Many of these contractions likely occurred as individualization permeated the upper provinces of childhood, reclassifying some (older) children as full-blown individuals, with rights and responsibilities to make independent sexual choices (Tatchell 2002 ). While we did not anticipate child-sexual-abuse contractions, reforms in this vein nevertheless exhibit the individualizing impulse. To the extent such qualifications apply, the dominance of individualizing sexlaw reforms is even greater than our initial coding scheme reveals.
Not only are individualizing reforms preponderant across different kinds of sex laws, but the preponderance holds across geographic, political, and religious divisions. For example, in the Americas, Europe, and Oceania, individualizing reforms comprise over 90 percent of total reforms, while in Africa and Asia the percentages are 71 and 74, respectively. In the formerly Communist countries of Eastern Europe, individualizing reforms comprise 95 percent of total reforms between 1945 and 2005. Even in the Islamic countries of the Middle East, individualizing reforms comprise 48 percent of total reforms during the period. Individualization prevailed everywhere except the Middle East; even there, nearly half the reforms followed the global-individualizing trend.
Finally, the data in Tables 1 and 2 underscore the scripted quality of sex-law reforms, showing the extent to which domestic reforms embody global institutions. Beyond a strong general tendency toward individualizing amendments, we observe a propensity for revisions that are substantively-and often literally-isomorphic. Vis-à-vis child sexual abuse, for example, we discover a main track removing distinctions between various kinds of sexual penetration (38 cases), another increasing the age of consent (33 cases), and a third neutralizing gender to protect boys as well as girls (26 cases). A fourth, less common, track erased distinctions between chaste and unchaste girls (9 cases). Isomorphic tendencies are also strong in the other domains. The fact that so many changes in so many different countries can be summarized so schematically signifies the diffusion of a discrete and limited number of legitimated reform templates, purveyed in part by INGOs and IGOs.
22 Domestic reforms unambiguously reflect global templates.
These exploratory findings support our global-institutional storyline and also undercut assumptions common to the case-study literature. We observe clear global trends that expand the scope of some sex laws and contract the scope of others in line with an overarching logic of individualization. Neither particular countries nor particular domains of sexual activity appear to be independent from others. Furthermore, we see that some reform waves (e.g., sodomy) began before interested actors gained political viability, while others (e.g., adultery) barely ever involved such stakeholders. 23 The local actors who animate the case-study literature appear to read from globally institutionalized scripts.
FORMAL WORLD-LEVEL ANALYSES
To formally test our arguments, we ran two sets of world-level event-count models in Stata 10.0, employing negative-binomial regression, the standard method to model count data when the variance of the data is greater than its mean. The exponentiated values of negative-binomial regression coefficients indicate the effect of a unit change in the independent variable on the incidence of the dependent variable. We calculated robust standard errors.
In the first set of models, we examined four dependent variables: annual global counts of individualizing sodomy-, adultery-, childsexual-abuse-, and rape-law reforms from 1945 to 2005 (i.e., contractions in the scope of sodomy and adultery laws and expansions in the scope of child-sexual-abuse and rape laws). The idea is to test hypotheses contra two assumptions prevalent in the case-study literature.
Hypothesis 1: Reforms are interdependent across country contexts. Thus, reform counts are positively associated with the cumulative density of previous reforms across country contexts. Hypothesis 2: Reforms are interdependent across domains of sexual activity. Thus, reform counts in each domain of sexual activity are positively associated with simultaneous reforms in the others.
To the extent these hypotheses hold, the findings confirm the benefits of our crossnational, cross-domain research design.
In the second set of models, we analyze our argument's substantive claims. The dependent variable is an aggregated world count of individualizing reforms from 1945 to 2000. We test three hypotheses representing interrelated dimensions of our global-institutional argument. The first addresses our core contention that the individualization of world models of society promotes individualizing sex-law reforms. The second and third examine the extent to which the rise of world legal and organizational infrastructures spur higher numbers of individualizing sex-law reforms. To the extent these hypotheses hold true, the results validate our argument's substantive claims.
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Because no previous study has analyzed sex-law reforms at the macro level, there are no competing hypotheses per se. We thus draw on broad sociological traditions to formulate three alternative explanations: (1) World development drives reform. The idea is that world economic development spurs world human development, including improvements in the living conditions and legal standing of women, children, and sexual minorities. (2) World social movements drive reform. The idea is that transnational actors -including women, lesbians, and gays -organize and mobilize to pursue their interests and make demands for legal amendments. (3) The world status of women drives reform. The idea is that worldwide changes in women's position in society alter power dynamics in ways that favor the revision of discriminatory regulations, including criminal regulations. We created variables measuring all these ideas by z-scoring and summing indicator values, as described in Table S4 in the online supplement. While we would prefer a broader set of indicators that are less reliant on INGO measures, the centrality of INGOs in world culture is well documented .
We take a two-pronged approach to dealing with multicollinearity. First, we test each dimension of our global-institutional argument separately. The three dimensions represent different facets of a single system, so naturally they are collinear. Second, we test partial and full versions of each model. The partial versions include just one competing variable (i.e., world development, the strongest of the three), and they have relatively low variance inflation factors, a standard measure of multicollinearity. The full versions include variables measuring all three competing hypotheses, and they have high variance inflation factors, above the problematic value of 10. The fact that the main findings are the same regardless lends confidence to our findings. Table 3 presents the first set of results. Across the board, the cumulative density of previous reforms has a positive and significant effect on current reforms worldwide. This suggests that individualizing reforms in one country are interrelated with reforms in others. Meanwhile, almost across the board, the number of simultaneous reforms has a positive and significant effect on current reforms worldwide. This suggests that individualizing reforms in one domain of sexual activity are interdependent with reforms in others. The one exception is adultery, which appears not to be affected by simultaneous reforms in sodomy, child-sexual-abuse, and rape laws. This may be due to the fact that adultery laws, as discussed earlier, are largely peculiar to Napoleonic Code countries and that our coding insufficiently captures one of the primary modes of individualization (i.e., extending existing adultery laws across old gender boundaries). In general, Table 3 supports our hypotheses and undermines two assumptions common to the case-study literature. The reform process transcends bounded country contexts and isolated domains of sexual activity. Our macro approach has clear merit. Table 4 shows the second set of models. All three dimensions of our global-institutional argument-measuring world individualization, world legalization, and world structurationdemonstrate positive and significant effects on individualizing reforms in both the partial and the full models. By contrast, only one of the competing variables-measuring world development-has a positive and significant effect, and only in two of six equations. Controlling for world individualization, world development promotes individualizing sex-law reforms. Controlling for world legalization and world structuration, however, development has no significant effect. The variables measuring world social movements and the world status of women are never significant. Overall, Table 4 lends strong support to our substantive claims. The rise of individualized and legalized world models of society and the structuration of world society catalyzed reforms in the criminal regulation of sex during the postwar period. 25 Altogether, the quantitative analyses confirm the exploratory analyses presented earlier. Contra conventional accounts, the sex-law reform process appears to be meaningfully global, operating across countries, and general, operating across domains of sexual activity. Consistent with our globalinstitutional account, key catalysts for sexlaw reforms represent a fundamental cultural change-the rise of the individual in world models of society-and two organizational changes-the rise of law in world models of society and the structuration of world society. Other world-level processes-rooted in development, social movements, and the status of women-prove less consequential.
SUPPLEMENTARY COUNTRY-LEVEL ANALYSES
To supplement the main world-level analyses, we present complementary country-level event-history analyses of the rates at which countries first contracted their sodomy and adultery laws and first expanded their rape and child-sexual-abuse laws between 1965 and 2005 (note that the starting time here is 1965 rather than 1945 due to the availability of key independent variables). Event-history analyses are appropriate for modeling events that occur at particular points in time. Coefficients and standard errors reflect the impact of independent variables on outcome rates, increasing or decreasing rates of reform over time. We ran constant-rate models, which assume that transition rates are constant in the absence of time-varying independent variables, with robust standard errors in Stata 9.
In the present context, these analyses have one primary goal: to test the contention that linkages to world society influence rates of reform, even holding constant reasonable For each type of sex law, we show two equations, the second of which includes the measure of lesbian and gay visibility. We include this variable because it comes closer to gauging domestic lesbian and gay socialmovement activity than any alternative we know. We include it cautiously, however, because doing so sharply reduces our case base, almost halving the number of countryyear observations. Table 5 shows the results. The hallmark finding is that linkages to world society influence rates of sex-law reform, even with reasonable domestic controls. In six of the eight equations, ties to world society, especially its individualizing and legalizing loci, significantly elevate rates of reform. Between 1965 and 2005, ties to world society sped the contraction of sodomy and adultery laws and the expansion of rape and child-sexual-abuse laws. Additionally, in all four equations that include the variable, ties to Napoleonic Code countries significantly affect rates of reform: rates of sodomy reform decrease (because a sodomy prohibition was missing from the Napoleonic blueprint) and rates of adultery reform increase (because an adultery prohibition was missing from the main alternative to the Napoleonic blueprint). In these four models, the significance of the Napoleonic effect holds steadier than the world-society effect, demonstrating the enduring legacy of original penal-code models. The results confirm the importance of INGOs and colonialism as mechanisms of diffusion.
Among the domestic control variables, democracy significantly affects reform rates in five of eight equations, speeding the contraction of sodomy and adultery laws and the expansion of rape laws. In three of eight equations, wealth significantly elevates, and Middle East significantly depresses, rates of reform. In one equation, the women's ministry variable has a positive and significant effect on the adoption of reforms. The Muslim and lesbian/gay variables have no significant effects. While a thorough consideration of domestic factors is beyond our scope here, these results provide tantalizing leads for future research. Perhaps most noteworthy is the finding that region trumps religion in regard to sex-law reforms between 1965 and 2005. The Muslim variable is never significant, while the Middle East variable is significant almost half of the time. On the whole, the results lend strong support to our perspective. World processes do not operate to the exclusion of domestic processes (Paxton et al. 2006 ), but their influence on sex-law reforms is strong and clear.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our analyses make several clear contributions. For the sociology of law, they illustrate the benefits of moving beyond the de jure-de facto issue to consider other dimensions of the law-society relationship, and especially other ways in which global and other social contexts affect and even constitute the law. Furthermore, our study demonstrates the viability and value of systematic world and cross-national analyses of legal change. For the sociology of sexuality, the analyses show striking evidence of the global reconception of sex-away from a procreative activity linked to collective and moral orders and toward an expressive activity linked to individual selves. We also document the benefits of scaling up from particular domains of sexual activity to sex in general. Finally, for the sociology of globalization, the analyses contribute to the growing store of evidence indicating fundamental changes in the ontological foundations of world society, from collective to individual bases. The analyses also extend the reach of global analysis into the field of law. Our framework implies collateral changes in the criminal regulation of sex, beyond the cases examined here (i.e., rape, adultery, sodomy, and child sexual abuse). We suggest that the rise of the individual in world models of society between 1945 and 2005 raised the priority of individual consent and lowered the priority of collective order across the policy field. Consider incest, for example. With individualization, criminal sanctions against private, consensual, adult-adult incest grew increasingly difficult to defend (and began slowly to fall), even as provisions against adult-child incest-deemed inherently nonconsensual-gained legitimacy (and rose). Prostitution reforms likewise followed the logic of individualization. Revisions generally loosened restrictions on consensual transactions and tightened restrictions on nonconsensual transactions. In both cases, the individualizing impulse undermined some aspects of criminal regulation and strengthened others. Even bestiality laws evolved, with several countries replacing outright bans on humananimal sexual contact (i.e., violations of collective order) with animal-cruelty statutes (i.e., violations of consent). Countries reformulated all kinds of sex laws along individualist lines in the post-World War II decades.
Our framework also suggests transformations in the overall social regulation of sex in the postwar era (Foucault 1978) . Criminal laws, after all, comprise only one form of social regulation; in some settings, social attitudes do more to repress alternative sexual identities than do penal codes (Rosenbloom 1996; Zuhur 2005) . ''Every society regulates sexual conduct. . . . Some of this regulation takes the form of social rules which have no legal effect; some of it is of a legal nature'' (Frimpong and Smith 1992:91) . Developments beyond criminal law-for instance, the hesitant embrace of lesbians and gays by mainstream Christian denominations-almost certainly reflect the logic of individualization. Some evidence suggests that the sexual self, a regulatory system in its own right, has been radically individualized with sometimes troubling consequences. 26 We suspect that all kinds of sexual-regulatory systems were individualized in the postwar period.
This article emphasizes worldwide trends in the criminal regulation of sex. We do not address several important related issues. First, the study deemphasizes cross-national variations and downplays outright resistance evident in a few fundamentalist Muslim countries.
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Cross-national and deviant-case analyses are underway. Second, the present study only begins to explore the mechanisms promoting regulatory change. We offer suggestive imagery on the relative importance of global experts and professionals but provide neither systematic evidence nor a full census of relevant mechanisms. Work toward these ends is being developed. Finally, we sidestep the critical question of implementation-that is, the relationship of law de jure to law de facto. We recently published an article on exactly this topic (Frank et al. 2009 ).
On the whole, our findings suggest that postwar transformations in criminal sex laws arose from a fundamental shift in world models of society. Individualization disembedded persons from families, nations, and other corporate bodies, and it re-rendered them as autonomous, empowered actors, recasting the imagined foundations of society. This change delegitimated definitions and criminal regulations of sex rooted in the collective order and procreation imperative, and it brought forth new definitions and regulations prioritizing individual liberty and the rule of consent. The whole process unleashed a global wave of sex-law reforms, dispersing the seeds of sexual revolution.
end of World War II and the founding of the United Nations, both of which sped long-term processes of individualization and globalization. 13. A Filipino legislator similarly articulated the raison d'être of adultery laws: ''To prevent the entry of illegitimate descendants to the bloodline. . . . Marital infidelity is an ill that reflects a lack of virtue and value which endangers the family as a foundation of our country's moral fiber'' (Villanueva 2004 ). 14. Neither the Bible nor the Qur'an directly addresses rape or child sexual abuse; they do emphasize adultery (and to a lesser extent sodomy). ''Since sexuality is sacred in the realm of marriage, sexuality outside of marriage becomes an unholy action that destroys the essence of marriage, and therefore destroys the family'' (quoted in Norman 2005:2). 15. The term rape is not used uniformly across country contexts. In some countries, it refers only to nonconsensual heterosexual intercourse between adults. In other countries, it includes other forms of nonconsensual sex, such as homosexual rape. Here, we restrict our focus to the common denominator across all rape laws: nonconsensual heterosexual intercourse between adults. 16. The countries most likely to flout the coloniallanguage rule are old and European (e.g., Denmark and Russia). Translations and translators allowed us to incorporate most such cases. 17. Even for countries with incomplete coverage, we often located the most crucial information-that is, marking penal-code reforms. Statutory changes are public matters and likely to enter public records. 18. Grattet, Jenness, and Curry (1998) call these ''domain'' rather than ''scope'' changes. In future analyses, we will add punishments to our considerations. Punishments and scopes typically rose and fell in concert, but the congruence was less perfect than we anticipated. The early years of our time period coincided with the therapeutic and rehabilitation movement, which entailed widespread rollbacks in punishments, even for crimes expanding in scope (see Murphy 1995) . 19. As Foucault (1978) argues, contemporary discourses on and regulations of sexuality are no more or less repressed or liberated than those they superseded. They are repressed and liberated along different dimensions. 20. Most Enlightenment philosophers continued to see sodomy as a contemptible vice, but they did not believe penal laws should punish private behaviors. 21. Additionally, sodomy and adultery reforms were less numerous than their counterparts because the former were often abrogated outright. 22. For example, in 2006, the International Centre for Missing and Exploited Children joined the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) to produce ''Child Pornography: Model Legislation and Global Review'' (http://www.icmec.org). 23. In the late 1990s, the women's movement finally targeted adultery laws for their unequal treatment of women and men. For obvious reasons, adultery never became a cause célèbre, and most reforms occurred before women's organizations joined the fray. 24. We operationalize the second main dependent variable as a cumulative count rather than a change score because reformed sex laws tend to endure and thus accumulate over time. As a precaution, we cut off this analysis at 2000 because several of our independent variables rely on data from the Yearbook of International Organizations, which undercounts the most recent activity . The main effects are the same regardless of the cutoff (i.e., 2000 or 2005). 25. Replacing world development with either of the other competing variables in the partial models changes neither the directions nor the significance levels of the global-institutional variables. In no equation is the effect of social movements or women's status positive and significant. Replacing raw reform counts with reforms per independent country changes neither the directions nor the significance levels of the global-institutional variables and development loses significance (in Table 4 , the number of independent countries is incorporated into world structuration). 26. Adam (2005) analyzes interviews with more than 100 gay and bisexual men who have abdicated safe-sex practices. They justify their choices in the individualistic language of ''informed consent, contractual interaction, free market choice, and responsibility'' (p. 333). 27. ''Certain Muslim spokespersons . . . see any vestiges of [homosexuality or feminism] as part of a grand conspiracy on the part of the West to attack the family'' (Zuhur 2005:49) . Of course, formal criminal regulations of homosexuality originally diffused from the West.
